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The body in Martin Amis’s Experience (2000)
Neil Vickers
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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the presentation of the body in Martin Amis’s memoir
Experience (2000) and compares Amis’s account of the growth of his mind and
body with ideas put forward by writers in the phenomenological and
psychoanalytic traditions. Using the ideas of body schema, projective
identification and idea of safety, it advances a new conceptual framework for
the thinking about the contribution that the body makes to selfhood in
autobiography.
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This paper puts forward a reading of Martin Amis’s memoir, Experience
(2000).1 Surprisingly little has been written about this virtuosic book. It fea-
tures in two monograph studies of Amis’s fiction, chiefly as a source of bio-
graphical information about Amis and his family.2 But I shall argue that,
quite apart from its documentary value, it has special relevance for theorists
of life-writing and for anyone with an interest in the autobiographical rep-
resentation of embodiment. For Experience makes some striking claims
about what it means to have a mind and a body. Some of these are explicit.
Amis tells us, for instance, that he had neglected his teeth for decades
because, unconsciously, he believed that losing them would enable him to
effect a deep change in his personality at some point in the future.
A good plan would have been to keep on going to the dentist. My respect for the
unconscious continues to grow. My unconscious mind might not have thought
much of the plan either, but it worked around that and made its preparations.
Really, the conscious mind can afford to give itself a rest. The big jobs are done
by the unconscious. The unconscious does it all.3
Teeth – his own or other people’s – were often on Amis’s mind whenever he
found himself in emotionally charged situations. The ﬁrst time he saw his
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father after the breakdown of his parents’ marriage, Kingsley was sporting a
new set of teeth, having generally avoided smiling in public until then. The
new teeth were a sign that his father had taken on a new identity. When
his mother Hilary had hers removed some years later, Amis was ‘harrowed’
by this vision of a ‘parody mother’, reminded once more of the separation
and all the sadness it had brought with it. His decision to travel to
New York in 1994 to have his teeth replaced by implants was a response to
a complex personal crisis. His ﬁrst marriage was disintegrating and he had
recently learned that his cousin Lucy Partington, who had gone missing in
December 1973, had been murdered by the serial killer, Fred West. Kingsley
was becoming increasingly ill and probably would not live much longer.
Losing his teeth was a rite of passage enabling marriage to his second wife,
Isabel Fonseca, and the acknowledgment of a daughter, Delilah Seale,
whose existence had been revealed to him in 1977 but whom he had never
known. It also set in motion a process by which he came to terms with Kings-
ley’s death and found a new father-ﬁgure in Saul Bellow.
All of this will be familiar to any reader of Experience. I want to suggest that
the memoir also contains a less explicit set of claims about what it means to
have a mind and a body. It is less explicit because it belongs to the things the
book shows rather than those it tells and it is never summed up into prop-
ositional statements by Amis. But it can be condensed into propositional
form. Its leading claims are as follows. People are first and foremost bodies.
People who are important to us are bodies with known psychophysical trajec-
tories. Only at the most sophisticated level of our experience do we take
account of a person’s humanity. Amis’s novel The Pregnant Widow (2011)
begins with an epigraph taken from Ovid: ‘Now I am ready to tell how
bodies are changed / Into different bodies’.4 I will suggest that the episodes
in Experience are best read as attempts by the author to change his body
into a succession of different bodies. Amis describes his adolescence as a pro-
gress from a highly disorganised mind-body, acutely vulnerable to physical
attack, to a less disorganised one, characterised by an improved ability to reg-
ister and withstand more of his own bodily experience. Improvement comes
about as a result of his recognition of other people. Crucially, such recognition
begins with identification with their physical experience. It is only when we
open ourselves up to other people’s physical experience that we can know
what it is like to be them. Intercorporeality, in other words, must precede
intersubjectivity. To share a phenomenal world with someone else, you
have to be willing to take their physical experience as a template for your
own and vice versa.
Many aspects of my argument have a bearing on Amis’s fiction. He has
often been criticised as a novelist for depriving his characters of complexity.
As his fellow-novelist John Banville has put it:
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The comic energy never flags, the metaphors dazzle, and whether he is describ-
ing a dog defecating or the play of light on a stretch of the Thames he achieves
an intensity of poetic specificity on a level with the work of such masters of style
as Nabokov and Updike. In the manner of character and plot, however, there is
overall a particular haziness, a lack of or withholding of focus, which can leave
the reader feeling baffled and slightly cheated. Even the main figures in the
novels, John Self in Money—“I’m called John Self. But then who isn’t?”—
Guy Clinch and the talentless Keith Talent in London Fields, and the rival
writers Richard Tull and Gwyn Barry in The Information, seem not so much
portraits of plausible human beings as marionettes gesticulating wildly in the
glare of Amis’s pyrotechnical prose. The women characters in particular can
seem thin to the point of two-dimensionality… 5
These are powerful points, well made. But if Experience has anything to tell us
about Amis as novelist, it is that he is most fascinated by those aspects of per-
sonhood that subtend our capacity for moral experience. These things are
primitive and pre-moral. Growing up involves learning to cope with a wide
range of bodily discomforts. Such discomforts are part of what we might
call psychosomatic normality. Adapting to the rhythms of one’s psychoso-
matic reality is a productive process that enables the self to develop, not
just the body. This is the process that Amis tries to capture in his memoir.
It may be that in his novels he is concerned with the other side of the coin,
that is to say, with characters who do not develop because they are unable
to form what the psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott memorably called ‘a psy-
chosomatic partnership’.6 In a very ﬁne paper published in this journal, Philip
Tew makes precisely this point in relation to Money.7 Tew argues that the
novel’s most fundamental subject is what it means to live in an ‘alexithymic’
world. Alexithymia is a disorder in which individuals have difﬁculty ﬁnding
words to describe their emotions. Instead, they somatise their emotions.8
Tew observes that the hero of Money, John Self, tries to live his life by
denying human inter-relatedness. He is ‘sexually compelled by women, but
is also repulsed by their physical demands and presence’.9 He is obsessed
by money and pornography. He likes his English girlfriend for her ‘brothelly
know-how and her top-dollar underwear’ and he talks to her about money
during sex.10 But he has no interiority as such. Amis is no John Self but he
is candid about the defensive, one might say ‘alexithymic’ purposes served
by his dental obsessions. The last time he saw his friend Lamorna Seale and
she told him he was the father of her daughter Delilah and gave him a photo-
graph of her, he was ‘as usual obsessively alert to the health and prettiness of
[Lamorna’s] dentition’.11 After showing his mother the photograph (Without
looking up, she said ‘Deﬁnitely.’), Delilah became an absence in his life, one of
the two girls whom he designates ‘My Missing’ (Lamorna committed suicide
the following year). The other is his cousin Lucy. Nine months after her dis-
appearance, Amis went to stay with his mother who was also being visited by
Lucy’s mother:
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They were over by the draining board, preparing a hot drink, while I remained
at the table, deep in an unpleasant, unconstructive and above all familiar dental
reverie; a recent explosion in the top deck had made the right-hand side of my
naval cleft tender to the touch – and so of course I kept touching it, feeling,
testing it… I woke up when I realised that the two sisters, for the first time
in my presence, were talking about Lucy.12
The implication is that toothache deadened him to at least part of their con-
versation. I could cite many more instances of this alexithymic mode of func-
tioning. But Experience is actually an account of a belated emergence out of
alexithymia: through intense physical pain, into mourning, culminating in a
new sense of relationship with others.
John Self’s undoing takes the form of a physical and psychological collapse.
Significantly for my purposes, it begins with intense toothache.
My head is a city, and various pains have now taken up residence in various
parts of my face. A gum-and-bone ache has launched a cooperative on my
upper west side. Across the park, neuralgia has rented a duplex in my fashion-
able east seventies. Downtown, my chin throbs with lofts of jaw-loss. As for my
brain, my hundreds, it’s Harlem up there, expanding in the summer fires. It
boils and swells. One day soon it is going to burst.13
Tew believes that the alexithymic world ofMoney ‘expresses something of the
disorder characterised by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in Anti-Oedipus:
Capitalism and Schizophrenia. In his view, Self’s schizoid existence is ‘diag-
nostically suggestive of wider, negative cultural tendencies’. It reﬂects ‘the pro-
pensities inculcated by an era of commodiﬁed consumption, excess proﬁt, and
aggressive egoism’.14 Although I ﬁnd this argument compelling, I will not be
able to consider the wider political implications of Experience in any depth,
even though there is a great deal to say about them.15 Neither will I be able
to do full justice to the literary virtuosity of Amis’s memoir. Instead I will
attempt to explain the dynamics of Amis’s metamorphoses from one body
into another. To do this, I will make three claims using theoretical concepts
derived from phenomenology and psychoanalysis.
First, I will argue that Amis’s recovery from alexithymia turns on his dis-
covery that he has always shared a body schema with other people. The idea of
the body schema I take from Paul Schilder (1886–1940 who is responsible for
the widely-used distinction between body image and body schema).16 The
body schema is the sum of the mind’s representations of where particular
body parts are in relation to the outside world and in relation to one
another. When we feel well, we are barely conscious of it. The body image,
by contrast, is a way of representing to ourselves how our body must
appear to others. Schilder thought that the most decisive factor in the for-
mation of a satisfactory body image was the feeling of being loved by
others. This enables us to love our own bodies which in turn has a beneficial
effect on the body schema. ‘Feeling our body intact is not a matter of course’
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he wrote. ‘It is the effect of self love. When destructive tendencies go on, the
body is spread over the world’.17 Although Schilder was very alive to the social
dimensions of bodily experience, he says little about the uses to which we put
other people’s body schemas. But I think that the introjection and projection
of body schemas is one of the central features of Amis’s memoir.
I ground this process in Melanie Klein’s idea of projective identification,
which constitutes my second major theoretical concept.18 Klein claimed
that there is a universal fantasy common to all human beings that we
contain within our bodies, concretely and immediately, people and bits of
people with whomwe have emotional relationships. She called these introjects
‘internal objects’.19 They people our ‘inner world’. At its most basic, projective
identification is a fantasy of a special kind in which part of the self is felt to be
located in another person. This gives us a concrete and immediate existence in
other people’s bodies. Projective identification has many uses. It provides a
means by which we can rid ourselves of intolerable experiences. A baby for
instance might project his distress into his mother. Significantly Klein empha-
sises that sometimes good experiences are projected. Projective identification
is also a primitive way of getting to know other people. As Klein put it in 1959,
‘By attributing part of our feelings to the other person, we understand their
feelings, needs and satisfactions’.20 In considering any single instance of pro-
jective identification, it is often helpful to ask whether its primary goal is to
take possession of something in someone else or to get another person to
carry some unwanted aspect of ourselves. Ronald Britton calls the first sort
of projective identification acquisitive and the second sort attributive.21
Perhaps the feature that distinguishes projective identification from Freudian
projection is its assumption that we can never simply disown something in
ourselves; we always take on aspects of others in the process of doing so.
All projection is somewhat introjective and all introjection is somewhat pro-
jective. Klein’s collaborator, W. R. Bion, thought that young infants use their
mothers as auxiliary minds.22 A baby cries because he is overwhelmed by a
fear of death. He cries in order to have his mother take this unbearable
feeling into her own mind and transform it so that it can be returned to
him in a form he can tolerate. The transformation of intolerable unmediated
physical experiences into thoughts was made possible by a specific introjective
capacity in the mother which he called reverie. I will suggest later that Amis
turns to others as containers for his psychophysical distress.
Projective identification attempts to locate our experience in other people’s
bodies. Usually, we are too caught up in the meanings of our dealings with
others to pay much attention to this fact. But in the case of the experiences
described in Amis’s memoir, the bodily nature of projective and introjective
processes is foregrounded to a quite exceptional degree. Although he may
not have known about the theory of projective identification, the French phe-
nomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to understand the lived body
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in terms of its practical engagement with the world has much in common with
Klein’s projective–introjective model of psychic life. ‘I experience my own
body as the power of adopting certain forms of behaviour and a certain
world’, he writes in The Phenomenology of Perception.23 So, for example,
when I see someone else play the piano I experience what I witness as a set
of suggestions to my own motility. Maybe if I did those things, I would
make beautiful sounds too? As Merleau-Ponty puts it in The Phenomenology
of Perception:
now, it is precisely my body that perceives the body of another, and discovers in
that other body a miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar way
of dealing with the world.… [T]he anonymous existence of which my body is
the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously.24
In ‘The Child’s Relations With Others’ – notes based on a series of lectures he
gave in 1951, in which he mentions Klein’s work with children – Merleau-
Ponty explains how this comes about. We take our cues from other bodies
by means of a body schema. The behaviours I witness of other bodies in
the world act on my body schema.
Husserl said that the perception of others is like a “phenomenon of coupling”
[accouplement].The term is anything but a metaphor. In perceiving the other,
my body and his are coupled, resulting in a sort of action which pairs them
[action à deux]. This conduct which I am able only to see, I live somehow
from a distance. I make it mine; I recover [reprendre] it or comprehend it. Reci-
procally I know that the gestures I make myself can be the objects of another’s
intention. It is this transfer of my intentions to the other’s body and of his
intentions to my own, my alienation of the other and his alienation of me,
that makes possible the perception of others.25
In the depths of our minds, it was not some other person playing the piano at
all; it was us. What I ﬁnd so helpful in Merleau-Ponty’s account of child devel-
opment is the claim that in order to have a clear sense of my own body schema
I have to lay hold of someone else’s. I believe that this process can be seen to
operate again and again in Amis’s memoir.
The third theoretical concept that I shall draw upon is the psychoanalyst
Joseph Sandler’s notion of ‘safety’.26 Sandler thought that in addition to avoid-
ing anxiety, human beings in general and children in particular often seek to
maximise a sense of safety or security. Safety in Sandler’s sense is not a form of
excitement and – strikingly, in a psychoanalytic paper – Sandler says that the
pursuit of safety is often more important than the pursuit of excitement. Now
plainly, illness undermines the sense of safety, sometimes catastrophically. But
having a strong sense of safety can make illness easier to bear. Sandler thought
that the sense of safety was rooted in ordinary perceptions. By making sense of
the world perceptually, we make it our own. The importance of the notion of
safety for the argument I am about to make is that it represents a counter-
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traumatic force in the personality. I will suggest, moreover, that having a
strong sense of safety enables us to contain others’ experiences in Bion’s
sense of transforming them into something thinkable. The visceral sensation
of danger is replaced by a mental one of understanding.
The structure of Experience
When Experience first appeared, it was one of only a handful of memoirs by
novelists that was not primarily about the making of the novelist or the novels.
In a perceptive early review of the book, John Lanchester contrasted novelists’
memoirs that made conspicuous use of fictional devices with those that ‘let life
have its messiness, and let the book pay the necessary price in terms of formal
imperfection’.27 Nabokov’s Speak, Memory was the model of the artful
memoir while the four volumes of Anthony Powell’s diaries exemplified
‘life-over-art’. ‘All novelist’s memoirs’, Lanchester went on, ‘exist somewhere
on this Nabokov-Powell continuum’.28 Inexplicably, Lanchester found Experi-
ence to be ‘well towards the life-over-art end of the spectrum’. Yet Amis’s book
abounds in novelistic tricks. Anyone who has read it right through will be able
to recognise all sorts of significance in apparently innocuous details in the
opening chapter alone, such as the fact that the two girls in the photographs
Amis keeps on his desk are smiling. And the reader coming to the book for the
first time will probably sense from the artfulness of the presentation that they
are being entrusted with secrets, even if they do not yet know what the secrets
are or why they matter. Before long, we are confronted with regular use of
intertexts, mises-en-abîmes, and symbols and this makes us wonder about
the author’s sense of the scale of his work. The use of Joycean punctuation
– em-dashes at the beginning of quotations with no mark to signal an
ending – suggests it might be vast: on a par with Ulysses, say.
Perhaps the most important point to make about Experience is that its
autobiographical ambitions are unusual. It is not a chronicle. It is a record
of how Amis’s past was transformed by the events of 1994–95. Amis
appears to flit frommemory to memory, without much regard for chronologi-
cal sequence, as if he were free-associating. At the same time, the fact that the
material is organised into chapters suggests that the arrangement of the scenes
will eventually be revealed as meaningful.
In the early chapters of the memoir, Amis calls to mind occasions when he
found his bodily experience overwhelming and even annihilating. These are
interspersed with recollections of moments in which his body did not interfere
too much with a good experience. But such moments are presented as having
been comparatively rare. Here is an example taken from the second chapter,
entitled ‘Rank’. ‘Rank’ is vague about precise sequence but it appears to begin
in Amis’s bedroom. Amis, in his late teens, is sunk in ‘a bottomless adolescent
cafard’ ‘taking an entire day to transport a single sock from one end of [his]
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bedroom to the other’, unable or at any rate disinclined to concentrate,
playing truant from school in order to enjoy the company of his friend Rob:
betting in betting shops (not the horses: the dogs), mincing up and down the
King’s Road in skintight velves and grimy silk scarves and haunting a coffee
bar called The Picasso, and smoking hash (then £8 an ounce) and trying to
pick up girls.
Rob, like Amis, is small in stature and difﬁdent. ‘I always feel such a short-arse
in the Picasso’, he explains. These excursions often ended with the two friends
going home in fright and ‘smoking [themselves] into a state of clinical para-
noia’. Other adventures mentioned include mixing with ‘the giantesses of the
gentry’ and feeling ‘as if we were walking between everybody else’s legs’.29
‘Rank’ is about adolescents at sea in the world and full of self-loathing.
Their bodies are a source of shame and pain to them. They do not believe
they are entitled to anyone’s respect; they are ‘rank’ in the sense described
by OED as ‘Highly offensive or loathsome, esp. morally; evil, abominable,
foul’. Shortly after these experiences, Amis leaves London for Sussex
Tutors, a boarding crammer. Sussex Tutors has much in common with his
bedroom. It is ‘a ramshackle warren that seemed to be all attic… it was
said that the building had once been a nursing home’ and it was surrounded
by nursing homes in a city that was itself one vast nursing home.30 Amis feels
like a convalescent. And ‘now at least, I was in love with literature. I read
poetry and I wrote poetry’. The central opposition of this chapter is
between a body that is overwhelmed by its own inadequacy, especially
when faced with the external world and one that is ‘nursed’ and allowed to
be alone. The somatic feeling that links the events of the ﬁrst half of the
chapter is humiliation at being seen. The somatic feeling that dominates the
second half is being able to look without fear. Sussex Tutors, a geriatric insti-
tution in disguise, can bear his contempt, as can the town’s inhabitants. The
young Amis looks on Brighton as ‘a town arranged like rows of seats around a
stage, the sea’. He reads. And perhaps he looks on himself in a new way
through his adoption of the name ‘Osric’, Claudius’s spy in Hamlet. He is
in Elsinore, albeit in an ignoble station. Here at least are the beginnings of
self-respect.
Merleau-Ponty famously defined the body in terms of its potential. I am
my body and my body is the potentiality of any given world.31 It allows us
to ‘reckon with the possible’.32 In a similar fashion, the fear and shame that
grip Amis as he ‘minced’ up and down the King’s Road with his friend Rob
might be seen as by-products of an attempt to ‘reckon with the possible’.
The friends have a shared body schema. They both feel that they are seen
as small, frightened and effeminate. Using the theory of projective identifi-
cation, we might suggest that they project their own self-loathing into the
other people on the street and as a result find it is everywhere. In the
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second vignette, looking is a less dangerous activity. The elderly in their
warrens are less ready to pass judgment than the modish habitués of the
Picasso. Looking back, he says he felt himself to be ‘a gilded and a repulsive
creature’.33 It was better than being merely repulsive.
In these early chapters, the characteristic movement is from extreme phys-
ical awkwardness (intensified by feelings of shame, loneliness, and anxiety), to
brief self-acceptance, culminating in the consciousness of another person’s
suffering. In a virtuosic touch, this consciousness is hidden from the reader
in the first couple of chapters – a point to which I shall return. But when it
does appear, starting in chapter 3, Amis depicts himself as being unable to
do much with it; indeed it often makes him more diffident. Here is how he
describes his life in London in 1974, not long after the publication of his
first novel:
My headaches and faceaches (and my vestigially sebum-rich complexion) made
me feel like a student. The high principles, or essential indifference, of the girl I
was futilely orbiting (kisses, nothing more), made me feel like a student. At the
same time, although I was edging forward into it, the adult world of promotion
and preferment still looked alien and menacing to me. There was still the suspi-
cion, despite all the current evidence, that you would not only fail but actually
go under. Perhaps everybody has this. Christopher Hitchens had it: we called it
‘tramp dread’. Earls Court was certainly very fully furnished with tramps,
drunks, beggars, babblers. Again in the mansion flat itself there was an old
doctor, close to retirement, who sometimes showed up for the night; I would
see him slumped over a sherry bottle in the lino-draped kitchen, or staggering
and flailing around in a beltless bathrobe and unbelievable Y-fronts (shapelessly
swilling [sic], and mackerel-grey).34
In this example, the down and outs of Earls Court are credited with a power
to absorb Amis and Hitchens into their own bodies (with all the attendant
troubles of those bodies) while the adult world of promotion and prefer-
ment exercises a power of repulsion. He and Hitchens identify with one
another (through their body schema) and project their shame and self-
doubt into the down-and-outs of Earls Court in order to reinforce the
part of them that belongs in the adult world of promotion and preferment.
But the ﬁgure of the alcoholic old doctor ‘close to retirement’ (i.e. still pro-
fessionally active) but with little grip on his own dignity suggests that this
projection will only get them so far. In one of the earliest and still most-
cited accounts of Klein’s hypothesis, Arthur Malin and James Grotstein
stressed that the redistribution of characteristics effected by projective
identiﬁcation does not always work to the advantage of the projector.
‘The external object now receives the projected parts, and then this alloy
– external object plus newly arrived projected part – is re-introjected to
complete the cycle’.35 The old doctor is a perfect example of a re-introjected
hybrid of external object plus projected part. He is no more a tramp than
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Amis or Hitchens but his slumping, staggering and ﬂailing makes him a
container for their deepest fears.
The next chapter, ‘Learning About Time’, comprises six episodes, four of
which are set in Spain. The first takes place in 1962 when Amis’s family
visited Robert Graves and his wife at their home in Majorca. The couple
spent an evening looking after the Amis children while Kingsley and Hilary
went out. To pass the time, Graves suggested they compose a poem together.
And when Graves said, ‘Philip. Why don’t you begin?’, my feared, revered and
much adored brother instantly and typically reached for the most subversive –
and above all the nearest – thing to hand. ‘There was an old farmer who sat on a
rick… ’ My ears hummed: we’re for it now, I thought…Graves smiled, and,
glancing downwards, said lightly, ‘You’re not meant to know that poem.’ I
think it was Beryl who got us going on something about domestic animals.36
The second incident, which also takes place at Graves’ home in Majorca,
occurred six years later. Before going to university Amis drove to Spain
with three friends, including Rob.
Then Rob said to Robert,
. Make that mountain open up.
. What?
. Turn it into a volcano.
. What?
. Go on. You can do it. Make that cloud go away.
. Oh, you’re –
. Summon a tidal wave.
. You little –
. Make the moon come out.
. Ooh, you –
. Make the –
And Robert got hold of Rob and roughly tickled him.
A couple of hours later the Mini Moke was edging its way down the drive.
Graves kept running back to the house to bring us more fresh-baked
bread, more labelled jars of pickles and homemade jam.37
These two episodes turn on an older person responding kindly to a younger
person. Graves understands that the young need their elders’ kindness and
forbearance and charity (the gifts that Graves presses on Amis and his
friends as they leave). The result is not gratitude so much as a sense of
safety. Safety, not time, is the true theme of ‘Learning About Time’. It is
first and foremost a physical feeling but is also an essential component of
psychological wellbeing. It is worth noting that all of the anecdotes Amis
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relates concerning safety highlight its emergent, intermittent character. It
comes and it goes; but eventually it establishes itself.
Its absence is explored in the next memory. Shortly after leaving Graves for
the second time, Amis and Rob begin their journey back to London. When
their car breaks down in a small town in Southern France, they phone
home for money so that they can have it repaired. Family members suggest
they get a job but the two friends cannot countenance that possibility and
instead ‘[settle] down to a week of patient trembling and starving and
hanging around the post office’ until the money comes through.38 They
reclaim their car and with their remaining 15 francs, buy strikingly childish
provisions: ‘some glacier-mints, some coffee-cream biscuits and some oran-
geade’.39 The neck of the orangeade bottle snaps off as Amis tries to open
it, ‘dramatically gashing my hand’.40 And when his turn comes to take the
wheel, he almost crashes into an ‘oncoming pantechnicon’ when someone
throws a cigarette down the back of his jeans. It is tempting to speculate
that these events were not just random instances of bad luck but a means
of expressing how impaired their sense of safety had become. This part of
Amis’s memoir ends with oblique allusions to Rob’s subsequent difficulties
in life, ‘his ordeals of park bench, of winter coalhole, or shelterlessness, and
prison’ (‘an eight-month sentence for a domino effect of drunk-driving
offences’).41 Tramp dread, indeed. Rob, it seems, never managed to create a
sense of safety in himself.
All of the remaining episodes in this chapter are about attempts to develop
one’s sense of safety by learning to withstand physical insults of various kinds.
The first vignette takes place in Andalucia in 1974 where Amis’s mother
Hilary has gone to live with her third husband and their young son Jaime.
One day Hilary becomes ‘the victim of an irresolute sexual assault by a
local youth’. She screams at him ‘Venga! Venga!’ believing it meant ‘Go
away! Go away!’ when it actually meant ‘Come on! Come on!’42 She should
have said Fuera! Fuera! In spite of this experience, Spain remains the
country Hilary loved best. Her reason becomes apparent to her son a few
days later when the two walk down a crowded street and notices Rafael, ‘a
spectacular spastic with an unbelievable gait’.
As Rafael, a flailing blur, inched along, and as passersby greeted him with cries
of Eh, coño! and an embrace and a mock left hook, my mother turned to me and
said, - I love living in Spain. I now regard him as completely normal.43
Watching Rafael walk down the street he realises it is possible to be awkward
without being ashamed. Indeed, it is even possible to be awkward and to feel
liked. As he watches others in this remarkable situation, he starts to see them
as versions of himself. Again, using the theory of projective identiﬁcation, we
might say that Amis identiﬁes with everybody else on the street by projecting
the part of himself who is ashamed of being small and having bad teeth into
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Rafael. But he also identiﬁes with the crowd in recognising how easy it is to
use Rafael for this purpose. By acknowledging this, the crowd give Rafael a
kind of love. (This is surely what Amis’s mother means when she says ‘I
love living in Spain. I now regard him as completely normal’.) For the ﬁrst
time in the memoir, Amis can reﬂect upon what it means to share a body
schema with someone else.
In Spain, people were openly unashamed of having bad teeth. Spain was a
‘place that had yet to experience dental self-consciousness’, and it ‘suited me
down to the ground because I hadn’t smiled unreservedly for five years’.44 It
was a safer place. The last two memories are the alexithymic ones I have
already touched upon. They detail his final meeting with Lamorna Seale,
who ‘never seemed stronger or happier’ (an impression strengthened by her
healthy and pretty dentition) and his aunt’s visit to his mother in which he
awakes from his dental reverie to hear her say ‘in a steady and unemphatic
voice that not a minute passed without her thinking of Lucy and wondering
where she was’.45
In a paper published in 1949, and against the grain of prevailing psycho-
analytic thinking, Donald Winnicott suggested that some somatoform dis-
orders should be seen not as acts of repression so much as primitive
attempts at mentalisation. They represent the ego’s first attempt to register
a difficulty.46 They do not tell a story in the way that say Freud’s patient
Dora’s limp tells a story (that she had, for instance, taken a ‘false step’
when she rejected Herr K). Winnicott was led to this view when he tried to
place psychosomatic disorders in a developmental framework. Under the
influence of Klein and Anna Freud, child development supplied the frame-
work for most debates inside the British Psychoanalytic Society in the
1940s and long afterwards. Winnicott, who was at that time associated with
the Klein group, took as his starting point the idea that the infant psyche
begins as nothing more than a mechanism for the imaginative elaboration
of somatic experiences. The infant finds that his bodily sensations are a
source of pleasure or unpleasure. But ‘the psyche is not felt by the individual
to be localized in the brain or indeed to be localized anywhere’. As he devel-
ops, he finds that his capacities for reflection and fantasy become a source of
strength – but only if his ‘holding environment’ is ‘good enough’. For ‘Certain
kinds of failure on the part of the mother, especially erratic behaviour,
produce over-activity of the mental functioning’.47 This causes the child to
mother himself. Non-hysterical somatic disorders are attempts to
draw the psyche from the mind back to its original intimate association with the
soma…One has also to be able to see the positive value of the somatic disturb-
ance in its work of counteracting a ‘seduction’ of the psyche into the mind.48
It is in precisely this light that Amis presents his toothache during 1994. In the
early parts of the memoir, it is given a threefold significance. First it is a
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private, Oedipally charged, signifier of the fragility of family relationships.
Second, it is a source of shame, leading him to recoil from others. Finally,
as the examples with his aunt and Lamorna Seale show, it supplies a means
of evading the knowledge of other people’s suffering. Becoming aware of
each of these associations enables him to initiate the deep psychic change
on which the first part of the book depends.
My aunt’s visit set me thinking, if that is quite the word I want, about the unas-
similably dismal event of the previous December. Can you think about some-
thing you can’t assimilate? I don’t think you can.49
I suggest that he assimilates it by relinquishing his sense of safety through a
series of childhood memories. He recalls that when he was at school he was
regularly made to prepare for a nuclear strike by the Soviet Union. He had
to lie down on the ﬂoor and hope that his desk lid would protect him from
the end of the world. He imagines what it must have been like for David Par-
tington, Lucy’s brother to ﬁnd that she had not come home from Cheltenham
on the night he drove her there. David and Lucy were in his mind when he
wrote in the ‘Preface’ to Einstein’s Monsters (1987) that ‘[nuclear weapons]
make me feel as if a child of mine has been out too long, much too long,
and already it is getting dark’.50 He also recalls Kingley’s unsympathetic
response to his hatred of nuclear weapons.
My brother Philip does a flawless imitation of Kingsley in this state: the whole
head vibrating, the eyes dangerously swollen, the tensed mouth in a violent false
smile, and (most tellingly) the nails of the forefingers scrabbling, almost blood-
ily, at the cuticles of the thumbs… 51
Arriving early at Lucy’s memorial service, he conducts a thought experiment.
He imagines each of his sons in the situation Lucy found herself in at ‘the
moment when they sensed the magnitude of the undifferentiated hatred
that was ranged against them. The ﬁrst time I did this I teetered back on
my feet… ’ There are multiple projective identiﬁcations in this thought exper-
iment and multiple shared body schemas. In one of them, he identiﬁes with
Fred West and projects Lucy’s fate into his sons. He identiﬁes further with
his sons in that situation and feels a sharp pang of guilt. He becomes at
once the bereaved parent and the abandoned child. He identiﬁes further
with Lucy’s brother David who is described as ‘[veering] back’ when he
learns that Amis has read every book he can lay his hands on about Fred
West. The teetering is a sign that Amis’s new-found capacity for empathy
works through his body. From this moment on, Amis will present his body
as a vessel in which other people’s psychophysical experience can be reclaimed
and, most crucially, transformed. He says that on the day of the memorial
service, he had a toothache so bad ‘the bulge on the side of my jaw threatened
closure of my right eye’. But it was still a cathartic experience.
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How very badly my body needs this, as it needs food and sleep and air.
Thoughts and feelings that had been trapped for twenty years were now
being released. They were very ready. I have known literary catharsis and dra-
matic catharsis, and I have mourned and have been comforted; but I had never
experienced misery and inspiration so purely combined.52
The lesson of 10 July 1994 seems to be that experiences can be shared. Amis
becomes curious about the experience of others. It is common enough in
memoirs for authors to use their own inﬁrmities to imagine those of a
loved one. If the loved person happens to be dead, the process of identifying
with him or her almost always has the effect of turning the person into a
sacriﬁcial proxy: they do the life-writer’s dying for them. In Amis’s case,
as we shall see, the main sacriﬁcial proxies are Kingsley and Lucy Partington
(but they are far from alone). The effect is offset by the increasing use of
literary analogues.
The next two chapters are all about Amis’s confrontation with his own
death. He goes to New York and sees his dentist, Mike Szabatura who finds
in addition to rotten teeth ‘a ridge of darkness just above the chin. This, I
learned, could be one of three things: a cancerous growth; a growth with a
long name that would keep coming back; a growth, but something manage-
able and unexotic’.53 Although Amis does not say so, the survival prospects
for someone with oral cancer were not good in 1994. For the next several
chapters, the reader has to wonder if he is reading a memoir by a dying
man. It is in this chapter that literary characters and literary events become
a factor in Amis’s imaginative relationships with others. Around the time
of Lucy Partington’s memorial service, Amis goes to Long Island with
Isabel Fonseca for a holiday at her mother’s house. There, he reads aloud to
Isabel’s dying brother, Bruno, whom Amis likens to ‘Eliot’s Christ, an infi-
nitely gentle, infinitely suffering thing’. He mentions two of the stories that
he read to Bruno: Borges’ The Circular Ruins and Kafka’s The Fasting-
Artist, noting ruefully that ‘every paragraph that left my lips seemed to be a
sinisterly poetic commentary on his condition’. The first is about a dying
man who hopes to dream a man into existence, ‘modelling’ him as he
dreams. ‘All that weekend,’ Amis writes, ‘I was a model of calm… I felt
modeled’.54 The second is about a performer who after a sequence of misfor-
tunes hires himself out to a circus where he dies of starvation, unnoticed.
Amis quotes the final paragraph of the story:
they buried the fasting-artist together with the straw. Into the cage they now put
a young panther. It was a palpable relief even to the most stolid to see this
savage animal thrashing about in the cafe that had been bleakly lifeless for so
long. He lacked nothing. The food he liked was brought to him by his
keepers without a second thought; even freedom he did not appear to miss;
that noble body, endowed almost to bursting-point with all it required,
seemed to carry its very freedom around with it – somewhere in the teeth
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apparently; and sheer delight at being alive made such a torch of the beast’s
breath that the spectators had difficulty in holding their ground against it.55
I am suggesting that in both cases Amis uses his identiﬁcations with ﬁgures in
the stories as counterweights enabling him to survive his identiﬁcation with
Bruno. Bruno bears the brunt of Amis’s mortality (attributive projective
identiﬁcation) while Amis appropriates the vitality of the modelled man
and the panther (acquisitive projective identiﬁcation).
This hardens into something of a pattern in the chapter dealing with his
maxillofacial surgery, entitled ‘Him Who is! Him Who Was!’ The chapter
begins with a quotation from a poem in Donne’s Songs and Sonets, ‘A Noc-
turnall upon S. Lucies day, Being the shortest day’. The speaker mourns his
beloved and claims to be the emblem of ‘every dead thing, / In whom Love
wrought new alchemy’. The connection between the ‘S. Lucie’ of Donne’s
poem and Lucy Partington is reinforced by the names and Amis notes that
Lucy disappeared on 27 December, close to the shortest day. Amis quotes
the ending of the poem in which the poet expresses a wish to join his
beloved in heaven.
Since shee enjoyes her long nights festivall,
Let mee prepare towards her, and let mee call
This houre her Vigill, and her eve, since this
Both the yeares, and the dayes deep midnight is.56
Amis immediately ‘prepares towards’ his Lucy when he presents himself for a
CAT scan. Lucy’s body had been ‘decapitated and dismembered, and her
remains were crammed into a shaft between leaking sewage pipes, along
with a knife, a rope, a section of masking tape and two hair-grips’.57
With an emery board between my jaws, a blue showercap on my head, with
straps over my brow and chin, I was sucked backwards into a kind of cyclotron
where I remained for ten minutes. The confinement or internment made me
think helplessly about Lucy Partington.58
He appropriates his Lucy’s death and long interment in order to reduce the
threat of what the CAT scanner might do or reveal. Kingsley’s claustrophobia
serves a similar purpose. Amis remembers how for a time during his twenties
he became frightened of travelling on the underground, a fear shared by his
father. Here, the comparison is terrifying but not fatal: the train going
through the underground tunnel is like the couch on which the patient lies
that slides through the CAT scanner. Donne’s poem enables Amis to com-
memorate his cousin and to face his own mortality ceremoniously. Concomi-
tantly, Lucy and Kingsley supply templates through which worries about his
own fate can be diminished. The same pattern of attributive and acquisitive
projective identiﬁcations is in play. Lucy and Kingsley can bear the burden
TEXTUAL PRACTICE 15
of his mortality for him. He meanwhile ‘prepares towards’ them, ignorant of
when he will actually die.
The remainder of the chapter focuses on Joyce, Nabokov and Yeats. Joyce
and Nabokov lost their teeth and wrote novels whose protagonists suffer
dental agonies no less severe than Amis’s own. Stephen Dedalus, Joyce’s fic-
tional alter ego, thinks to himself that his teeth have turned to shells. He calls
himself ‘toothless Kinch, the superman’. Joyce’s poem ‘A Prayer’ was written
in 1924 after an eye operation which left him blind in one eye. Amis notes that
while the poem is generally assumed to be addressed to Joyce’s wife, when he
thinks of the poem he thinks of his dentist.
‘The second of the three stanzas runs (beautifully and to me unbearably)’:
I dare not withstand the cold touch that I dread
Draw from me still
My slow life! Bend deeper on me, threatening head,
Proud by my downfall, remembering, pitying
Him who is, him who was!’59
The basic elements ofDonne’s poem – two lovers and death– are repeated here;
but in Joyce’s poem the beloved holds sway over death because she is somehow
in league with it. Amis notes Richard Ellmann’s gloss that the poet ‘confuses
desire and pain, [pain] because his mind associates his subjection to this
beloved with other subjections – to eye trouble and to death.’ But he does
not quote Ellmann’s further comment that ‘As he exerted total control over
his books, Joyce dreamed of agonizing self-abandonment to female power’.60
This observation is surely relevant to Amis’s theme. For if his dentist Mike Sza-
batura is the allegorical ﬁgure of death drawing Amis’s slow life from him (you
could say he becomes Amis’s very own Fred West), Isabel is his Nora Joyce.
One of the most interesting literary digressions concerns Nabokov’s
campus novel, Pnin (1957). The eponymous hero of that book has poor
teeth and a heart condition when he arrives at a small East Coast liberal
arts college to take up a professorship of Russian. Two events are given
special significance in Amis’s summary. First, Pnin has to have his teeth
replaced by dentures. Second, he receives a letter from his ex-wife, Liza, the
love of his life, who pretends she would like to marry him again. The
removal of the teeth is recorded in full:
His tongue, a fat sleek seal, used to flop and slide so happily among the familiar
rocks, checking the contours of a battered but still secure kingdom, plunging
from cave to cove, climbing this jag, nuzzling that notch, finding a shred of
sweet seaweed in the same old cleft; but now not a landmark remained and
all there existed was a great dark wound, a terra incognita of gums which
dread and disgust forbade one to investigate.61
Shortly after this ordeal, he discovers that Liza’s overture was a mere ruse to
make him pay for her passage to America. Pnin is unconsolable. ‘I haf noﬁng
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left, noﬁng, noﬁng!’Amis quotes these lines in order to reveal a further motive
for not having his teeth removed. ‘I sometimes believed that sex and teeth
would be coterminous,’ he writes. ‘Love would end. Poor Pnin had
nothing.’ But in Amis’s case, Isabel Fonseca
came bellydancing out of the bathroom wearing (a) your silk bathrobe and (b)
my teeth. Both were then removed.
This was the war against shame.
The next morning I woke early and lay there quietly laughing and weeping into
the pillow. I felt fragile, guileless and exquisitely consoled. The quality of the
happiness made me think of a poem – early Yeats – that I had once copied
out for my sister to memorise, thirty years ago. Had I the… the dark cloths
of light and night and half night… I have spread my… Tread softly because
you… 62
The rehearsal of the workings of a tired mind with ellipses is surely a sly
tribute to the ‘Eumaeus’ chapter of Ulysses. And the point about the Yeats
poem that he remembers (‘He Wishes for the Cloths of Heaven’) is that
like ‘A Prayer’ it is about submission to the beloved but with the important
difference that in it, happy vulnerability replaces death. By wearing Amis’s
dentures, Isabel Fonseca transforms the symbolic equation of teeth with mor-
tality. Death has been conquered and all of the tragic associations of teeth are
temporarily subsumed into Eros.
Amis couches his autobiography as the history of his relationship to his
body. How should we receive it? Is it a credible account of an embodied life
or merely a novelist’s ‘Just So’ story? Roger Luckhurst inclines to the latter
view. He argues that since the 1990s, writers of commercially successful
memoirs have had to demonstrate inwardness with trauma. Trauma has
acquired the status of the true sign of the real. The fate of Lucy Partington
enabled Amis to lay claim to credibility in these terms.63 A number of
critics have complained that Lucy Partington became a much more significant
figure for Amis through the writing of Experience than she had ever been
when she was alive. Marian Partington, Lucy’s sister, said he hardly knew
her.64 And how heavily did Kingsley’s fate really weigh on him? Again, the
same critics note that he chose not to be present at Kingsley’s death.
Although these criticisms may be true, they miss their target. For Amis is
quite explicit about his use of other people in the memoir. As I have already
stated, people are first and foremost bodies here. We are bound to them by our
shared physical experiences. It is by investigating the hidden aspects of their
physical experience that we encounter their humanity. The differentiation of
these three kinds of inter-relatedness dominates the first part of the memoir.
In the first place, there are experiences that threaten to overwhelm him. The
bottomless adolescent cafard, the mincing, the tramp dread, the shame at
being small or otherwise repellent to women, the dental reverie he falls into
in the presence of his aunt nine months after the disappearance of her
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daughter, fall squarely into this category. These are distinct from a second cat-
egory comprising much rarer moments of relatively unburdened engagement
with an expanding world. Under this heading we might number his becoming
‘Osric’ in Brighton/Elsinore, ‘in love with poetry’, and his two experiences of
receiving Robert Graves’s hospitality. Finally, there is a third category of
bodily experiences that are shared that enable him to develop. When he
sees himself as a version of Rafael, the ‘flailing blur’, he can accept himself.
Amis tells us that after Elizabeth Jane Howard left Kingsley, he used to
numb himself to sleep with ‘late night carbo-fests’: ‘As if in the interests of
hibernation he would load up his cheeks with confectionery at about twice
the rate that he ingested it’.65 This indulgence creates an uncanny parallel
with Amis in his postoperative state. ‘Jesus, Dad’, I once said, ‘what’s going
on in there? Your face is the size of a basketball’.66 It is as if all his life he
has unwittingly been recapitulating Kingsley’s psycho-physical trajectory.
Superficially, this memory supplies uncanny retrospective confirmation to
Amis that ‘grief lives in the mouth’. But perhaps more importantly it
teaches him that bodily sensation is continuous with some very archaic
areas of mentalisation. There is a kind of grief that can only be apprehended
through bizarre physical experience.
Recognition of others repeatedly takes the form of identifications with their
physical experience. David’s jolt on learning that Amis has read ‘all the books’
about Fred West; Kingsley’s binge-eating of cakes and sweets after the
breakup of his second marriage; Hilary’s looking at her toothless reflection
in a mirror, but above all, Lucy’s murder and abandonment become psycho-
physical precedents or parameters enabling Amis to submit to major maxillo-
facial surgery and to change his life. The claim that these precursor
experiences seem to make cumulatively (though it is never made explicitly)
is that rebirth of the mind is only possible through the rebirth of the body.
I suggested earlier that the consciousness of another person’s suffering is
invisibly present in the first two chapters which take the form of Amis
talking to his sons while driving a car. These car journeys are initiated by a
driver who has been transformed by the knowledge of what happened after
Lucy Partington’s last-known car journey (when she was driven to Chelten-
ham by her brother David). The antithesis between this knowledge and his
sons’ innocence could hardly be greater. With great skill, the reader is put
in his sons’ place early in the memoir.
I am not suggesting that is Amis is knowingly engaging with post-Klei-
nian psychoanalytic thinking. But I do think that the developmental story
he puts forward about his bodily experience is strikingly consonant with
a theory offered by Armando Ferrari (1922–2006). In his book From the
Eclipse of the Body to the Dawn of Thought (2004), Ferrari argues that
our first object relationship is not with the breast or the mother but with
the body.67 The body radiates sensation. Ferrari calls it the ‘Concrete
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Original Object’ because we are always drawn back to it. It ‘stands before
the mind as a permanently unsolved problem’. The task of other objects
– parents and carers – is to help the infant to bear his relationship with
his body. Ferrari sees development taking place along two perpendicular
axes. The vertical or ‘Onefold’ axis encapsulates the infant’s (and later the
individual’s) relationship with his body. The horizontal or ‘Twofold’ axis
governs his relationship with others. The mind ‘cools down’ the heat ema-
nating from the body.68 Eventually, it manages to throw it under eclipse,
though never permanently. Ferrari’s extension of Bion’s theory arises
from his insistence that the body needs another person’s reverie as much
as the mind. I think the imaginative faculty on which Amis lays so much
stress when thinking about the affection in which Rafael is held is a
version of this somatically inflected reverie.
Another Italian psychoanalyst influenced by Bion, Antonino Ferro
(1947–), has argued that psychosomatic disorders are signs of facts that
have gone unprocessed not only by the patient but also by those he loves.69
Once these facts are ‘seen’ it becomes possible to isolate the psychosomatic
disorder as a medical problem. What seems to happen in Experience is the
author stumbles upon the discovery that mental and physical ills must be
‘seen’ and experienced collectively.
It might be objected that Amis is creating his own personal psychoso-
matic mythology and that none of the claims I am extrapolating from his
book have any wider significance. The only way to test this is for scholars
of life-writing and illness narrative to collect a range of testimonies from
writers who have tried to reconstruct their experience in ways that pay
close attention to the body. Here I would enter the caveat that only
writers of great skill can capture the interplay of the mind and the body
in the way that Amis does in Experience. But I see no reason why a range
of equally skilled narratives would not help to enrich our sense of the
body and its contribution to selfhood more generally. Amis writes from a
strongly male and able-bodied perspective. It is likely that narratives of
the body by women would yield further and different information about
the interplay of the body and the mind. I would contend that first-person
memoirs offer theorists of life-writing and others the opportunity to chal-
lenge the anti-mental bias of modern biomedicine by reclaiming the
whole experiential field in which illness occurs in the West today. The
turn to complex neurological theory by some life-writing theorists in
attempting to understand mind-body relationships is based on an undue
degree of pessimism concerning the power of creative writers to describe
their own and our experience authoritatively.70 I hope that this paper has
supplied grounds for exploring a different approach.
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